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Abstract
Despite the high perceived value and increasing sever-
ity of online information controls, a data-driven under-
standing of the phenomenon has remained elusive. In
this paper, we consider two design points in the space
of Internet censorship measurement with particular em-
phasis on how they address the challenges of locating
vantage points, choosing content to test, and analyzing
results. We discuss the trade offs of decisions made by
each platform and show how the resulting data provides
complementary views of global censorship. Finally, we
discuss lessons learned and open challenges discovered
through our experiences.
1 Introduction
The last five years have cemented the Internet as critical
infrastructure for communication. In particular, it has
demonstrated high utility for citizens and political ac-
tivists to obtain accurate information, organize political
movements, and express dissent. This fact has not gone
unnoticed, with governments clamping down on this
medium via censorship and information controls. Con-
sequently, there has been a surge of interest in measur-
ing various aspects of online information controls. More
specifically, data obtained from such measurements has
been used by (1) political activists to understand the mo-
tivation for and the impact of such government policies
and (2) researchers to build safer and more secure cen-
sorship circumvention tools by understanding the tech-
niques used to implement these policies [1].
While there have been numerous efforts to character-
ize online information controls [2–7], the data gathered
or used by these measurements have limited scope due to
the specificity of locations and time-periods considered.
In order to gain a nuanced understanding of the evolution
of Internet censorship, in terms of policy and techniques,
a measurement platform needs to be able to gather lon-
gitudinal data from a diverse set of regions while per-
forming accurate analysis using robust and well specified
techniques. We present and compare two such platforms
– ICLab and OONI– that represent different points in the
censorship measurement design space.
In this paper, we first identify three primary design
decisions made in the development of censorship mea-
surement platforms. Then, we describe how ICLab and
OONI address these decisions, while considering the im-
pact of these decisions on the measurement results pro-
duced by the systems. Finally, we show how ICLab
and OONI, when used together, provide a unique insight
into the current state of information controls around the
globe.
2 Design Decisions
We now discuss the choices of (1) where measurements
are run, (2) how measurements are run, and (3) how data
is intepreted . These three design decisions are central to
the design of a global censorship measurement platform.
2.1 Where measurements are run
There are two options when considering vantage points:
crowd-sourced and dedicated infrastructure vantage
points. Platforms using a crowd-sourced approach rely
on volunteers running measurement software. They have
the ability to turn citizens in any location into vantage
points. Dedicated infrastructure, on the other hand are
distributed and operated exclusively for the platform.
Both approaches have their own benefits and drawbacks.
Cost and availability. A hurdle in setting up a dedi-
cated infrastructure is distributing infrastructure globally.
However, once this infrastructure is in place, it has the
capability of performing on-demand measurements; lim-
ited only by the reliability and uptime of the infrastruc-
ture. Crowd-sourced platforms, on the other hand, in-
cur no setup cost but are dependent on the availability of
1
ar
X
iv
:1
60
6.
01
97
9v
2 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 29
 O
ct 
20
16
volunteers to execute measurements. As a consequence,
crowd-sourced platforms are unable to provide a reliable
flow of measurements from a region.
Representativeness and diversity of measurements.
Crowd-sourced platforms have the potential to obtain a
view of the Internet from a wide variety of networks (e.g.,
residential, academic, and corporate). In contrast, dedi-
cated infrastructure faces an uphill battle of distributing
devices or may leverage existing infrastructure (e.g., aca-
demic networks, or dedicated hosting networks). Van-
tage point location can impact conclusions drawn from
their measurements. As an example, measurements con-
ducted from the UK academic network (JANET) do not
observe the “Great Firewall of Cameron” [8], since they
are placed outside of its purview. Crowd-sourced plat-
forms can also leverage public interest and news cover-
age to introduce additional vantage points.
Safety and risk. Information controls measurements
using humans in the field poses a significant and hard to
quantify risk. In many regions (e.g., Syria) this risk has
been determined to be too high for volunteers. Such risks
impede crowd-sourced measurements, while infrastruc-
ture (such as VPN or hosting networks) allow for mea-
surements while posing little to no risk to users.
2.2 Measurement autonomy
A censorship measurement platform can either use a cen-
tral server to schedule experiments, or leave these tasks
to each vantage point. This dichotomy has an impact on
several capabilities of the platform.
Time and context sensitive measurements. The time
and political context of measurements are important for
understanding evolving and abrupt policy changes. As
an example, during the rise of ISIS in 2014, the Indian
government blocked (and subsequently unblocked) ac-
cess to 32 websites including GitHub, Vimeo, and Paste-
Bin for propagating “Anti India content” [9]. Centrally
controlled measurement platforms have the advantage of
being able to evolve existing and schedule new measure-
ments in response to changing political and social situa-
tions. Locally controlled platforms, however, do not have
this capability. Instead they are dependent on the update
schedule of the local vantage point.
Infrastructure requirements. The ability to remotely
schedule experiments and aggregate data centrally allows
for the use of computationally constrained infrastructure,
not needing technically savvy local maintenance efforts.
This comes with the cost of bandwidth requirements
associated with shipping unprocessed data to a central
server. Locally controlled platforms require local man-
agement of the platform infrastructure to ensure up-to-
date experiments, higher computational capabilities for
processing gathered data, and lower bandwidth for com-
municating processed results of measurements.
2.3 Gathering and interpreting data
A censorship measurement platform must specify data
collected and how it will identify censorship in this data.
Type and quantity of data gathered. A platform may
record packet captures of entire tests or selectively gather
data such as packet headers and responses. While com-
plete packet captures are ideal for deep aposteriori anal-
ysis and to identify censorship not visible at the appli-
cation layer. However, they require root privileges, high
storage and bandwidth requirements, and may acciden-
tally collect data of other system users.
Identifying censorship events. Another challenge that
arises during the processing of gathered data is defin-
ing when “censorship” has occurred. This task is com-
plicated by strange protocol implementations (e.g., load
balancers that cause gaps in TCP sequence numbers),
server side blocking [10], and regular network failures.
3 The ICLab and OONI Platforms
In this section we describe the design decisions made
during the development of the ICLab and OONI plat-
forms.
3.1 Vantage points
The most fundamental difference between the ICLab and
OONI platforms is the approach each system takes to re-
cruit vantage points. ICLab relies on a dedicated infras-
tructure to perform measurements. This allows measure-
ments that require permissions that may not be compat-
ible with software to be run on end-user systems. As
a consequence, the system has thus far focused on de-
ployment on VPN vantage points and a limited deploy-
ment of Raspberry Pi’s installed with ICLab software.
In contrast, OONI takes a lighter-weight software-based
approach. and assumes some amount of technical savvy
on the part of volunteers. This leads to differences in
the availability and representativeness of measurements
from each platform. In Figure 1a, we see that as a re-
sult of the decision to use VPN end points, ICLab is able
to provide vantage points for measurements in signifi-
cantly more countries than OONI (151 for ICLab and 46
for OONI in the last 100 days1). However, we found
that that OONI’s crowd-sourced model is able to provide
more AS-level diversity – i.e., OONI provides vantage
points from an average of 3.15 different networks (ASes)
1Since its release in 2012, OONI has received nearly 10M measure-
ments from volunteers in 95 countries.
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in each country, compared to ICLab’s average of 1.46
networks per country.
Both platforms have measurements
>40 total < 10 total
ICLab has measurements
>40 < 10
OONI has measurements
>40 < 10
(a) Global availability of measurements.
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(b) Country-level temporal availability. Green and red indicate
the availability of measurement data from ICLab and OONI, re-
spectively. Black indicates the availability of measurements from
both platforms from the same region on the given day.
Figure 1: Availability of measurements from the ICLab
and OONI platforms in the last 100 days.
3.2 System architecture
In terms of system architectures, ICLab uses a cen-
tral controller to schedule experiments while OONI pro-
cesses data both on the vantage point and inside of its
data processing pipeline. This introduces several key dif-
ferences in how each platform handles its vantage points.
Measurement scheduling. ICLab takes a centralized
approach to scheduling experiments, leveraging a single
server that is able to schedule experiments on all de-
ployed nodes (e.g., VPNs, Raspberry Pis) or a subset
thereof (e.g, a given country). This facilitates the ex-
ecution of ongoing or one-off measurements. In con-
trast, OONI takes a decentralized approach. Recom-
mended measurements are hard-coded into the OONI
platform source-code and require vantage points (techni-
cally savvy volunteers) to regularly download updates in
order to execute new measurements. Repetition of mea-
surements is dependent on individual volunteer availabil-
ity. Volunteers also have the option to add their own tests
and modify inputs to existing tests (e.g., they may change
the set of URLs being used by a test).
Performing measurements. ICLab and OONI also
differ in their approach to performing measurements.
ICLab takes a “simple node” approach, with nodes
largely being responsible for collecting data and trans-
mitting it back to the central server for later analysis.
This lowers the computational requirement of the van-
tage points but increased demands on bandwidth. In
contrast, OONI performs measurements and analysis on
the device and ships processed data back to a central
server. Importantly, OONI allows volunteers to opt-out
of submitting measurement reports to the OONI publish-
ing server, while ICLab takes an informed approach with
vantage points opting into participate in the system.
Figure 1b shows the impacts of these decisions on the
platforms. OONI has a core set of vantage points that
continuously measure and a few opportunistic measure-
ments. ICLab on the other hand exhibits large coordi-
nated testing as a result of its VPN vantage points.
3.3 Tests and analysis
Both platforms perform a battery of tests to identify cen-
sors that may be blocking or manipulating content. The
ICLab test infrastructure is extensible, allowing new tests
to be scheduled on vantage points without the need for
updating their software. In addition to custom tests, the
ICLab platform periodically schedules a baseline test on
each vantage point. This baseline experiment tests con-
nectivity to a set of URLs that are composed of the Alexa
Top 500 websites and a country-specific list of poten-
tially blocked URLs (obtained from the CitizenLab). In
contrast, tests on the OONI platform are not scheduled
remotely and new tests need to be obtained by software
updates. Existing tests, however, do not require soft-
ware updates to evolve the list of domains that they test
connectivity to. The default experiments included in
the OONI platform test connectivity to the global and
country-specific lists of potentially blocked URLs (also
obtained from the CitizenLab).
In terms of analysis, the ICLab platform does not per-
form analysis on the vantage points, rather it leaves all
post-processing to the centralized servers. This allows
ICLab to perform retroactive analysis on existing results.
The OONI platform, on the other hand, performs data
analysis on the vantage points. This allows independent
and private deployments by in-country watchdog groups.
We now briefly describe the tests conducted to identify
censorship by each platform.
DNS anomaly detection. For each URL to be tested
on a given vantage point, the ICLab and OONI vantage
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points perform DNS name resolution queries for the do-
main name associated with that URL using both the de-
fault DNS resolver configured on the machine as well as
Google’s DNS at 8.8.8.8. The ICLab platform con-
cludes that an anomaly (e.g., DNS injection, tampering,
etc.) has occurred if a second DNS response is received
within 2 seconds of the first. The OONI platform on the
other hand, makes several requests at once and does not
wait between requests. Requests are also made to con-
trol resolver that binds to a non standard DNS port. The
client is able to report failures to resolve directly, and
resolutions are included in the generated report to allow
further analysis by the central analysis infrastructure.
HTTP tampering, proxy, and blockpage detection.
For each URL to be tested on a given vantage point, the
ICLab and OONI vantage points issue HTTP GET re-
quests and record received responses, with ICLab to fol-
low redirects. The responses received from these tests
are processed to identify blockpages and evidence of
HTTP tampering. The ICLab platform uses regular ex-
pression pattern matching to identify known blockpages
and responses obtained by the same test executed from a
censor-free vantage point in the US to identify instances
of content manipulation. The OONI platform uses meta-
data (e.g., status codes, response sizes, etc.) obtained
from a Tor control channel to identify HTTP tampering.
Additionally, the OONI platform is also able to detect
the presence of HTTP proxies. It does this by generat-
ing malformed HTTP requests that cause proxies on the
vantage point network to reveal their presence (e.g., by
modifying the malformed headers). The data processing
pipeline is then capable of identifying specific types of
proxy software based on known fingerprints.
TLS man-in-the-middle detection. The ICLab plat-
form also performs tests on HTTPS compatible URLs.
For each such URL, a TLS handshake is performed and
all server certificates that are received are checked for va-
lidity. If they are found to have been expired or signed
by an untrusted certificate authority, a TLS anomaly is
reported.
Sequence number, TTL, and RST anomaly detection.
For each of the above tests, the ICLab platform analyzes
raw data (packet captures) of TCP streams to identify in-
consistent sequence number and TTL values in packet
headers. Additionally, the presence of pre-mature RST
packets is also recorded. If any of these are identified,
the ICLab platform reports anomalies that may be the re-
sult of a censor injecting packets into a TCP stream.
TCP connectivity test. The OONI platform attempts to
establish TCP connections to a specified set of hosts to
validate that the handshake can be completed and detect
instances of IP level blocking. In this test, the vantage
point attempts to establish a connection to the end host
directly and also via a Tor control channel. If the control
channel succeeds, while the direct connection fails, an
anomaly is reported.
Circumvention protocol tests. Finally, the OONI
platform also includes a set of tests designed to detect
the availability of several circumvention system by (1)
mimicking the protocols involved and (2) by launch-
ing bundled instances of the actual tools and checking
whether they are able to successfully complete connec-
tions. Currently the test considers the connectivity of all
Tor pluggable transports (scramblesuit, meek, fteproxy,
obfsproxy versions 2 to 4), Psiphon, Lantern, and the
OpenVPN protocol.
4 Comparing results of ICLab and OONI
In this section, we provide results from our analysis of
measurements generated by the ICLab and OONI plat-
forms. In particular, we use measurements from each
platform to (1) understand which countries are the least
free – i.e., have the highest amounts of censorship and (2)
to demonstrate challanges in finding ground truth when
conducting censorship measurements. We use these re-
sults to demonstrate how the ICLab and OONI platforms
can provide complementary insights into censor behav-
ior.
4.1 Identifying the least free countries
Using the tests described in Section 3, we now report the
countries found to be the least free based on measure-
ments obtained from the ICLab and OONI platforms.
Figure 2 illustrates the fraction of URLs that were
censored in each of the six least free countries – Iran
(IR), Saudi Arabia (SA), India (IN), Cyprus (CY), China
(CN), and Russia (RU) – based on tests conducted by
the ICLab platform; and Iran (IR), Saudi Arabia (SA),
India (IN), Greece (GR), Qatar (QA), and Turkey (TR)
according to OONI’s measurements. We note that the
remaining countries only displayed marginal amounts of
censorship – i.e., under 5% of all tested URLs were cen-
sored. We find that both platforms find the most censor-
ship in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and India.
In the specific case of Iran, both the ICLab and OONI
platforms show comparably high levels of censorship.
We see that both platforms are able to detect the large
fraction of blockpages served by Iranian censors and that
in addition to identifying the Iran blockpage, the TTL
and RST anomaly detectors in the ICLab platform are
also triggered. We attribute the extremely high levels of
blocking observed to the fact that the measurements from
both platforms were carried out around the same time
period as the Iranian parliamentary elections. We inves-
tigate further using past data from the OONI platform
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Figure 2: The six most censored countries according to
measurements from ICLab (top) and OONI (bottom).
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Figure 3: The number of domains seen blocked in Iran
spiked in OONI measurement data in fall of 2015, several
months before the election.
and confirm that in October 2015, four months before
the elections, a sharp rise in censorship was observed.
This is illustrated in Figure 3. The URLs tested by the
OONI platform during this time included content relat-
ing to political news and speech, social media, censor-
ship circumvention tools, and pornography.
Analyzing the results for Saudi Arabia and India we
find that measurements performed on the ICLab plat-
form see significantly less information controls than on
the OONI platform. In particular, while measurements
from the ICLab platform detected a number of block-
pages and RSTs in each of these countries, we find that
it did not encounter the large number of DNS anoma-
lies and incomplete TCP connections that are observed
by the OONI platform. We attribute this to the fact that
measurements from the OONI platform are usually ob-
URL # of VPs URL # of VPs
battle.net 1459 uol.com.br 842
163.com 1417 alibaba.com 748
baidu.com 1350 yahoo.com 700
hao123.com 1333 directrev.com 564
youth.cn 918 roblox.com 415
Table 1: Websites with the highest number of TCP RST
packets in ICLab.
tained from residential networks where covert censorship
is observed (i.e., censorship without explicitly serving a
blockpage).
Finally, the results from both platforms also provide an
insight into the censorship infrastructure in place in each
country. The presence of a single dominant method of
censorship in Iran and Saudi Arabia are indicative of the
presence of a central censorship apparatus, while the case
of India – where multiple equally dominant methods are
observed – is indicative of censorship being implemented
by local ISPs rather than the central government.
4.2 The elusive ground truth
Ground truth plays a crucial role in analyzing censor-
ship measurement data, and there are several challenges
associated with gathering ground-truth censorship data
at scale. Comparing measurement data collected in the
field against a baseline collected in well-provisioned net-
work settings (i.e., in the lab) helps delineate censorship
from server-side blocking caused by VPN blocking or
automated measurements not looking like real user traf-
fic. Table 1 shows websites with the highest number of
TCP RST packets in their streams across ICLab’s van-
tage points, pointing to possible server-side blocking.
Among the list of websites with many observed RSTs
are several websites hosted in China (e.g., 163.com
and baidu.com) that exhibit anomalous TCP behav-
iors when queried by ICLab– i.e., the IPID values from
SYN and SYN-ACK packets are different from the rest
of the packets receieved, and sequence numbers overlap-
ping between packets.
This anomaly is hard to distinguish from anoma-
lous traits that are caused by the Great Firewall of
China. Similarly, gaming websites roblox.com and
battle.net aggressively block VPN users, while
yahoo.com and directrev.com (an ad market-
place website) do the same to a lesser degree. Other web-
sites can also respond unexpectedly (e.g., due to server
misconfiguration) and trigger false alarms. As an exam-
ple, the Iranian retail website digikala.com shows
sequence number anomalies as tested by 587 of ICLab’s
vantage points, but is not censored in any of them.
5
OONI faces a similar problem in determining ground
truth. Many of the ‘control’ measurements used by the
local client to determine what sites should look like are
conducted through Tor. In practice, many websites either
fully deny, or display substantially different content to
visitors through the Tor network, making it difficult for
the probe to determine if the local result is correct or not.
An additional challenge arises due to websites that are
suddenly unavailable for non-censorship reasons – e.g.,
a dead website with a registered domain and unavailable
webserver. For these cases, the ICLab platform verifies
if the webpage could be loaded from any one of its other
vantage points. If the page was unable to be loaded suc-
cessfully, it is discarded from the test outputs. Figure 4
illustrates the URLs that were censored in the 20 least
free countries. We observe several vertical bands in this
figure. These are indicative of dead websites, ones which
could not be loaded from any vantage point.
��
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Figure 4: URLs censored in the 20 least free countries
according to ICLab. Colors are indicative of the type
of blocking observed (see Figure 2). The black vertical
lines show websites that are either no longer available or
have blocked access to all of the ICLab vantage points.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we presented the fundamental design deci-
sions faced by developers of large-scale longitudinal cen-
sorship measurement platforms – where to obtain van-
tage points, how to use these vantage points to collect
measurements, what measurements to collect, and how
to analyze them. We then described the decisions that
were made in development of the ICLab and OONI plat-
form and their influence on the measurements obtained
by these platforms.
In particular, we find that the ICLab platform is able
to provide a more reliable and global picture of censor-
ship by harnessing dedicated global VPN infrastructures
in addition to on-the-ground volunteers. However, we
also find that this dependence on VPNs can result in
measurements being carried out on vantage points fur-
ther away from residential networks which impacts the
conclusions drawn from the platform. For example, the
ICLab platform sees significantly less censorship than
the OONI platform in India and Saudi Arabia. To this
extent, it is important to work with representatives in af-
fected countries, and the responsive nature of OONI has
been successful in gaining support to measure several im-
portant political events. The challenge of obtaining rep-
resentative, global, reliable, and response measurements
remains a goal we continue to aspire to.
In addition, we showed how the results obtained from
each of these platforms can be used to provide a deeper
insight into understanding regional censorship at a global
scale. By analyzing the types of censorship observed in
several countries we were able to identify characteris-
tics of the implemented censorship apparatus – i.e., re-
sults obtained by both platforms suggest the presence of
a decentralized censorship infrastructure in India and a
mostly centralized infrastructure in Iran and Saudi Ara-
bia.
Finally, our current investigation also uncovers open
challenges that remain in being able to distinguish cen-
sorship from anomalies that arise from phenomena such
as misconfigured webservers, network outages, end-
point discrimination, and unresponsive websites. Our
platforms plan on addressing these limitations in future
work.
References
[1] The Tor Project. Pluggable transports. https://
archive.is/0vhLU.
[2] Abdelberi Chaabane et al. Censorship in the Wild: Ana-
lyzing Internet Filtering in Syria. In IMC, 2014.
[3] A. Sfakianakis, E. Athanasopoulos, and S. Ioannidis.
Censmon: A Web censorship monitor. In USENIX FOCI,
2011.
[4] Hal Roberts, David Larochelle, Rob Faris, and John Pal-
frey. Mapping local Internet control. In Computer Com-
munications Workshop. IEEE, 2011.
[5] Joss Wright, Tulio Souza, and Ian Brown. Fine-Grained
Censorship Mapping: Information Sources, Legality and
Ethics. In FOCI, 2011.
[6] Simurgh Aryan, Homa Aryan, and J. Alex Halderman.
Internet censorship in Iran: A first look. In Free and Open
Communications on the Internet. USENIX, 2013.
[7] Giuseppe Aceto, Alessio Botta, Antonio Pescape`, Nick
Feamster, M. Faheem Awan, Tahir Ahmad, and Saad
Qaisar. Monitoring Internet censorship with UBICA. In
Traffic Monitoring and Analysis. Springer, 2015.
[8] EFF. The Great Firewall of Cameron: Why The UK’s
Filtering By Fiat Won’t Work, and Won’t Help, 2013.
6
[9] ZDNet. India blocks 32 websites, including GitHub, In-
ternet Archive, Pastebin, Vimeo, 2014.
[10] S. Khattak et al. Do you see what i see? differential treat-
ment of anonymous users. NDSS, 2016.
7
